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R
ecently the question of whether a monetary aggregate, and in particular
M2, is a useful intermediate target for monetary policy has been the
subject of intense debate. The most striking feature of this debate,
which has been largely empirical, is that the central issues that are relevant
for analyzing M2’s usefulness in the conduct of monetary policy have been
neglected. Issues involving the controllability of M2 and the structural relation-
ship between M2 and economic activity have not been adequately addressed.
Rather, much of the debate has focused on the notion of predictive content.
The argument expressed in much of the literature is that if money lacks
predictive content, then it has no useful role as either an information variable,
an intermediate target, or, when possible, an instrument of monetary policy.1
This argument basically misses the point. In this article we argue that Granger-
causality tests generally are not a proper test of the usefulness of money as
an intermediate target. We also argue that evaluating the usefulness of any
monetary aggregate in the conduct of monetary policy requires a structural
model.
The authors would like to thank Tim Cook and Peter Ireland for many helpful suggestions.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 This view is expressed rather strongly in Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and seems at least
to be implicit in most of the literature cited in this article. In what follows we use the terms infor-
mation variable, intermediate target, and instrument in standard ways. An information variable
is one that provides information about future economic activity and in particular about variables
in the Fed’s objective function. An intermediate target is a variable that the Fed explicitly tries
to hit by altering its monetary instrument, which is a variable under direct control. That is, an
instrument is either the federal funds rate or an element of the Fed’s balance sheet.
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The ﬁrst section of this article reviews the empirical debate concerning
M2’s usefulness as an intermediate target. In particular we look at the result
of Friedman and Kuttner (1992, 1993) which indicates that in the presence
of ﬁnancial market variables, M2 contains no predictive content for real in-
come. We ﬁnd that this result is fragile and that M2 does have signiﬁcant
predictive content for both real and nominal GDP when the statistical tests
are properly speciﬁed. This agrees with similar evidence presented in Feldstein
and Stock (1993), Hess and Porter (1992), Becketti and Morris (1992), and
Konishi, Ramey, and Granger (1992). Thus under current operating procedures
M2 provides useful information about the economy.
In Section 2 we take a deeper look at the notion of predictive content
and its limitations in designing monetary policy. In particular, we show that
a failure to ﬁnd predictive content says very little about the potential useful-
ness of a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target. The lack of predictive
content can arise as a result of operating procedures. It is entirely possible
that the same monetary aggregate could serve as a reliable intermediate target
or information variable under alternative operating procedures. Thus merely
analyzing reduced-form relationships for the purpose of making theoretical
arguments about the potential usefulness of M2, or any other measure of money,
in formulating policy can be misleading.
Also, the presence of predictive content does not necessarily imply that
M2 would make a good intermediate target. For that to be the case, M2 must
be controllable and must have an effect on economic variables that the Fed
ultimately wishes to inﬂuence. Feldstein and Stock (1993) realize that M2’s
usefulness as an intermediate target hinges on its controllability and assume
that the Fed can perfectly control M2. In Section 3 we analyze the effects of
relaxing this assumption and show that allowing for imperfect control weakens
their argument substantially.
In Section 4 we look at another assumption that is crucial to the Feldstein
and Stock analysis and to the entire recent empirical debate. That assumption
involves the invariance of the estimated reduced-form structures to changes
in Federal Reserve operating procedures. Here we show that the changes in
operating procedures advocated by Feldstein and Stock should have substan-
tial effects on the economy’s reduced form. Thus, issues related to the Lucas
critique cannot easily be dismissed and there is reason to question the validity
of their policy experiments.
The combined analysis presented in Sections 2 and 4 indicates that the lines
of research evaluated in this article are not likely to be productive from the
standpoint of understanding and designing monetary policy. Granger-causality
tests say very little about the usefulness of a variable as a monetary instru-
ment or intermediate target. Further, the assumption that the Lucas critique
is not measurably important in discussions concerning alternative operating
procedures is rather heroic.            
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1. A REVIEW OF THE STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
In this section we look at the statistical evidence regarding the ability of M2 to
help predict future movements in either real or nominal income. The key issue
here is the treatment of cointegration. Engle and Granger (1987) show that
proper estimation of a nonstationary system must explicitly account for any
cointegrating relationships. Merely differencing nonstationary data and then
performing statistical analysis does not properly account for long-run relation-
ships, while leaving the data in levels omits relevant parameter restrictions.
To highlight the differences that can occur with alternative speciﬁcations, we
present Granger-causality tests results using differenced data with and without
the inclusion of a cointegrating vector. The ﬁnding of Friedman and Kuttner
that M2 has no predictive content is shown to be in part a result of an improper
statistical representation.
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where the symbol “∆” indicates ﬁrst differencing, y (Y) is the log of real
(nominal) GDP, M is the log of nominal M2, p is the log of deﬂator on GDP, r
is either the three-month federal funds rate or the six-month commercial paper
rate,2 s is the spread between the six-month commercial paper rate and the
three-month Treasury bill rate, τ is a term structure variable measuring the
yield difference between the ten-year Treasury bond and the three-month funds
rate, and z is the cointegrated vector between M2, the price level, income, and
nominal interest rates implied by a stable money demand function.
The spread is included to take account of the ﬁnancial effects emphasized
by Friedman and Kuttner (1992), namely, that this spread reﬂects a risk pre-
mium that can vary cyclically. It is also inﬂuenced by changing liquidity needs
since Treasury bills are more liquid than commercial paper. Thus the spread
variable is a stand-in both for changes in the demand for ﬁnancial liquidity
2 We also experimented with the Treasury bill rate. The major difference is that the spread
and the term structure are less signiﬁcant (sometimes very much so) when the Treasury bill rate
is employed.             
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and for changes in risk. Increases in risk or liquidity demands should have a
negative effect on economic activity.
The term structure variable is included to portray the stance of monetary
policy (see Bernanke and Blinder [1992]). An upward slope in the term struc-
ture indicates expectations of rising inﬂation and loose monetary policy. Thus
the coefﬁcients on this variable should be positive in the nominal GDP regres-
sions and positive in the real GDP regressions if there are signiﬁcant nominal
rigidities in the economy. Alternatively, an upward-sloping yield curve could be
associated with an upward-sloping term structure of real interest rates signaling
expected consumption growth and thus has a positive association with future
real output. If the term structure variable is largely reﬂecting the expected be-
havior of future real rates, then the effect on nominal GDP could be ambiguous
since real output growth could result in lower inﬂation.
The regressions depicted in equations (1) and (2) are run in two different
ways. One way is that of Friedman and Kuttner in which the cointegrating re-
lationship is ignored (i.e., the constraints β = b = 0 are incorrectly imposed).
The alternative methodology includes the cointegrating relationship among M2,
the price level, real income, and nominal interest rates.3
The importance of including cointegration can be examined within the
conﬁnes of a simple linear rational expectation model. Suppose the real part of
the economy was exogenous and the nominal side could be depicted as
rt = Etpt+1 − pt + wt (3)
Mt = pt − crt + vt (4)
Mt = µ + Mt−1 + xt, (5)
where wt, vt, and xt are white-noise disturbances to the nominal interest rate,
money demand, and money supply, respectively. Equation (3) is the Fisher re-
lationship relating nominal interest rates to expected inﬂation and a stochastic
real rate of interest. The money demand disturbance, vt, incorporates changes
in real income and transactions costs, while xt is a money control error. The
model displays a cointegrating relationship between money and prices, with
Mt − pt being stationary.
The reduced form for money and prices is
Mt = µ + Mt−1 + xt (6)
3 We use a cointegrating vector similar to Feldstein and Stock (1993) in which yt+Pt−Mt−
αrt is stationary. With interest rates multiplied by 100, α, the interest semi-elasticity of money
demand, is equal to .0052 for commercial paper regressions and .0041 for regressions using the
federal funds rate.            
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Using equations (6) and (7) we can examine the importance of including coin-
tegrating terms when testing if money growth helps predict future inﬂation.
From the structure, it is obvious that money does help predict the future price
level, but statistical tests will generally fail to conﬁrm this feature of the model
if the cointegrating relationship is ignored. To illustrate this point, we gener-
ated 2,000 samples of 100 observations each and tested for Granger-causality.4
Without cointegration the lagged money growth was only signiﬁcant at the
5 percent signiﬁcance level 4.5 percent of the time, while with cointegration
money Granger-caused prices 95 percent of the time.
Having illustrated the potential importance of including cointegrating vec-
tors, we reinvestigate the Friedman-Kuttner results that M2 does not Granger-
cause real output. The results are depicted in Table 1, where we report p-values
or signiﬁcance levels on Granger-causality tests. The sample period is 1960:1
through 1993:1 and four lags of each variable are included (i.e., n = 4i n
equation [1]). Column 1 of Panel (a) basically replicates Friedman and Kutt-
ner’s result that the spread has signiﬁcant predictive content while M2 does
not. Replacing the commercial paper rate by the funds rate implies that M2 is
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, while adding a term structure term implies
that M2 is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Like Feldstein and Stock (1993)
we ﬁnd that including a cointegrating term yields the result that M2 is highly
signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, even the one favored by Friedman and Kuttner,
as is the spread and the term structure.5
Since the monetary authority may also be interested in the forecasts of
nominal magnitudes when making policy decisions, we also look at the predic-
tive content of M2 growth and the spread in regressions where nominal GDP
is the dependent variable. The results are depicted in Table 2. Here both the
spread and M2 are found to be highly signiﬁcant predictors of nominal output.
Granger-causality tests are not the only way of examining predictive con-
tent. One may also wish to know if the effects of certain variables are long-lived
or if they die out quickly over time. To address these issues, we look at impulse
4 In the simulations both w and v are independently drawn from an N (0,1) distribution while
xt ∼ N (0, .1). The parameter µ = .05 and c = 2 reﬂect an interest elasticity of approximately
.10. The VARs were run with ﬁve lags of money growth and inﬂation.
5 Friedman and Kuttner’s results have been attacked on other grounds. Becketti and Morris
(1992) ﬁnd that eliminating the period October 1979–October 1982 when the Fed altered its
operating procedures implies that M2 Granger-causes real output, while Konishi, Ramey, and
Granger (1992) attribute most of the spread’s predictive power to the inclusion of the 1971–1975
period. We were able to replicate the Becketti and Morris result but did not ﬁnd the Konishi,
Ramey, and Granger result to be robust to alternative speciﬁcations. Using equation (1) with
β  = 0, we still ﬁnd the spread has predictive content for real GDP when using the funds rate,
the commercial paper rate, or both the funds rate and the term structure.               
46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 p-Values for Variables in Real Income Equations
1960:1–1993:1
Panel (a): No Cointegration
Independent
Variable
∆y .5273 .6551 .5429 .6942
∆m .1520 .0912 .0348 .0364
∆p .0217 .0301 .0196 .0096
∆rff na .0264 na .0095
∆rcp .0593 na .0816 na
s .0155 .0147 .0063 .0054
τ na na .0650 .0167
Panel (b): With Cointegration
Independent
Variable
y .0291 .0355 .0246 .0122
m .0070 .0037 .0012 .0004
p .0009 .0012 .0007 .0001
rff na .0010 na .0001
rcp .0026 na .0029 na
s .0031 .0026 .0012 .0008
τ na na .0476 .0044
zmd .0025 .0022 .0019 .0005
Deﬁnition of variables: y = ln(real GDP), m = ln(nominal M2), p = ln(implicit price deﬂator
for GDP), rff = quarterly average federal funds rate, rcp = six-month commercial paper rate,
s = six-month commercial paper rate minus the three-month Treasury bill rate, τ = ten-year
Treasury bond rate minus the federal funds rate.
response functions. These results are displayed in Figures 1 and 2. Here we
only use the speciﬁcation that includes cointegration. The impulse response
functions and the dashed lines that depict their 95 percent conﬁdence band
are displayed in Figure 1 and indicate that M2 has a short-lived effect on real
output growth when ordered second in the orthogonalization procedure (panel
A) but not much effect when ordered third (panel B). The spread, however, has
a signiﬁcant negative effect on real growth independent of ordering (panels C
and D). The results for nominal income are depicted in Figure 2. Here a shock
to M2 has a signiﬁcant effect on nominal GDP that is quite long-lived (panels
A and B), while the spread’s effect is signiﬁcant and surprisingly positive at
business cycle frequencies.6
6 We also tested if the sum of coefﬁcients on the spread variable were signiﬁcant and found
that we could not reject this sum being equal to zero in either the real or nominal GDP regressions.                
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Table 2 p-Values for Variables in Nominal Income Equations
1960:1–1993:1
Panel (a): No Cointegration
Independent
Variable
∆y .7074 .6172 .8817 .8975
∆m .0261 .0204 .0065 .0053
∆rff na .0109 na .0067
∆rcp .0313 na .0756 na
s .0803 .1046 .0390 .0309
τ na na .2649 .0731
Panel (b): With Cointegration
Independent
Variable
y .0739 .0520 .1048 .0416
m .0020 .0013 .0005 .0001
rff na .0007 na .0002
rcp .0024 na .0059 na
s .0402 .0490 .0246 .0152
τ na na .2411 .0277
zmd .0053 .0042 .0052 .0013
Deﬁnition of variables: y = ln(nominal GDP), m = ln(nominal M2), rff = quarterly average
federal funds rate, rcp = six-month commercial paper rate, s = six-month commercial paper rate
minus the three-month Treasury bill rate, τ = ten-year Treasury bond rate minus the federal funds
rate.
2. A DEEPER LOOK AT GRANGER-CAUSALITY
The analysis conducted in the previous section supports the results of a number
of other studies that M2 has signiﬁcant predictive content for future movements
in both real and nominal GDP. Given the tremendous amount of effort exerted
in analyzing this issue, it is important to ask whether Granger-causality is a
relevant and essential property of a variable if that variable is to be useful
in conducting monetary policy. In particular, does the absence of Granger-
causality imply that a variable cannot be used as an intermediate target or
instrument? The somewhat counterintuitive answer is no. Thus, for example,
the fact that some studies show that the monetary base does not Granger-cause
real economic activity provides little guidance concerning the potential role of
the base in conducting monetary policy.7
7 Examples depicting the usefulness of the base as an instrument of policy can be found in
McCallum (1988), Judd and Motley (1991), and Hess, Small, and Brayton (1993).        
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Symmetrically the observation of Granger-causality does not necessarily
imply that a variable will be useful as an intermediate target or instrument.
Issues of controllability and the ability of a variable to causally inﬂuence
economic variables of primary concern must be addressed as well. Granger-
causality, therefore, merely indicates that under existing policy a variable pro-
vides useful information about future economic activity.
In this section we examine by way of an illustration why the lack of
Granger-causality may not be particularly relevant. In the next two sections we
look at the other side of the coin and show that Granger-causality does not
necessarily imply that a variable will be useful as an intermediate target.
To illustrate our point, we use the simple economic framework in the
preceding example. Instead of using money as an instrument, the Fed uses an
interest rate instrument whose behavior is given by
rt = µrrt−1 + µppt−1.( 5  )              
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Thus the economy is depicted by equations (3), (4), and (5 ). The reduced form




































8 As shown in Boyd and Dotsey (1993), equation (8) is the unique nonexplosive solution








| δ1 |≤1 and | δ2 |≥1 for appropriate choices of µr and µp.            
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where each upper right-hand element of each Πi matrix is zero. Thus money
will fail to Granger-cause prices. This failure says nothing about money’s use-
fulness as a monetary instrument or intermediate target, since it is obvious that
in this simple model economy controlling money will control prices.9,10
3. M2 AS AN INTERMEDIATE TARGET AND
THE FELDSTEIN-STOCK ANALYSIS
As mentioned, the other side of this last result, that a lack of predictive con-
tent does not rule out the usefulness of a monetary aggregate in formulating
monetary policy, is that predictive content does not necessarily imply that an
aggregate should be an instrument or an intermediate target. Predictive content
merely indicates that under current operating procedures a variable provides
some useful information for forecasting future economic activity. In order to
make the case that a variable would be a good instrument or intermediate
target, one must show that a policy that incorporates the variable in either role
improves economic performance in a welfare-enhancing way. Feldstein and
Stock (1993) undertake such an exercise for M2.
They perform this exercise by estimating equations of the form (2), with a
cointegrating vector included showing that M2 has signiﬁcant predictive con-
tent for future nominal GDP. They also perform very sophisticated tests of the
stability of the M2-nominal GDP relationship and ﬁnd that it is indeed stable.
The conclusion drawn from these results is that the reduced-form relationship
they have estimated is likely to be invariant to changes in operating procedures,
since the Fed changed operating procedures over their sample. The Fed, there-
fore, can proﬁtably exploit the relationship between M2 and nominal GDP to
reduce the variability of nominal GDP growth.
To see to what extent this variability can be reduced, they calculate the opti-
mal M2 supply function, treating their reduced form as a structural relationship
and assuming that M2 is perfectly controllable. They use the non-cointegrated
system for this purpose. They ﬁnd that optimally controlling M2 would result
9 In particular, studies that show that the monetary base has little predictive content for
future economic activity do not imply that the base would be an ineffective monetary instrument
or intermediate target. McCallum (1993b) makes a similar argument with respect to stability of
the base nominal GDP relationship.
10 We also looked at some alternative policies. It appears that money’s failure to Granger-
cause output occurs whenever the Fed insulates the economy from money demand disturbances.         
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in quarterly growth rates of nominal GDP that are 88 percent as variable as
they are now.11 They then show that a simple feedback rule
Mt = −λYt−1 + (1 − λ)Mt−1 (10)
performs almost as well.
One of the critical assumptions in their analysis is that M2 is perfectly
controllable. Taking for the moment the assumption that their reduced form is
invariant to the change in operating procedures that they propose, we wish to
see how their simple rule (for optimally chosen λ) would perform if M2 were
not perfectly controllable. We use the cointegrated speciﬁcation of equation (2)
since our earlier results indicate that this is the preferred speciﬁcation. Like
Feldstein and Stock we drop the term structure and spread variable.
To see what the effect of using rule (10) has on the variance of nominal
GDP, we conduct the same Monte-Carlo experiment that they do. First we
generate 2,000 simulations of 40 quarters each using a four-variable vector
autoregression that includes a cointegrating vector. The variables are nominal
GDP, the price deﬂator on GDP, the three-month Treasury bill rate, and M2.
More precisely, the ﬁrst equation of this system looks like (2) with the term
structure and spread terms omitted. In performing the simulations the random
disturbances and coefﬁcients are drawn from the appropriate distributions. We
then replace the estimated M2 equation with (10) and perform the same exer-
cise. Using the simulated data, ratios of the variances of nominal GDP growth
can be constructed and analyzed. The results of the analysis are presented in
Table 3.
For the case λ = 0.3 and perfect controllability, the mean of these ratios
is .948, indicating that under the rule (10) nominal GDP’s variance could be
reduced to roughly 95 percent of its current value. Also 68 percent of the ratios
are less than one, indicating that following (10) reduced variability most of the
time. As the assumption of controllability is relaxed by adding to (10) a control
error scaled by the percentage of M2’s actual variance, the performance of the
rule deteriorates. For example, if an attempt to control M2 as an intermediate
target resulted in half the quarterly variability we now see, nominal output
variance would only be reduced to .985 of its value under current procedures.
Variability also only declines in 55 percent of the simulations. Thus the strength
of the argument for using M2 as an intermediate target is intimately related
to the issue of controllability. But the potential controllability of M2 cannot
be answered by this exercise. In order to answer that question, one needs a
11 They report a good deal more information. For example, they ﬁnd that in 90 percent
of their simulated decades, simulated GDP is less variable than actual GDP. Had they used
the cointegrated system for this exercise, they would have found even greater improvement since
including the cointegrating vector improves the R2 of the model. (We thank Jim Stock for pointing
this out to us.)                  
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Table 3 The Predicted Reduction in the Variance of Nominal
GDP Growth from Following a Simple Monetary Rule,









0 0 .913 .115 .914 .81
0 .1 .941 .121 .938 .72
0 .3 .948 .120 .954 .68
25% of actual 0 1.153 .268 1.085 .31
25% of actual .1 .998 .119 .992 .51
25% of actual .3 .965 .103 .972 .64
50% of actual .3 .985 .098 .989 .55
75% of actual .3 .999 .098 1.004 .48
100% of actual .3 1.015 .101 1.015 .42
Note: These results were constructed by a Monte Carlo procedure that produced 2,000 draws of
40 quarters of predicted nominal GDP growth using the proposed money rule and random draws
from the distribution of the reduced-form parameters and the reduced-form disturbances.
structural model since there is no period in which the Fed actually tried to
control M2.
4. A DEEPER LOOK AT REDUCED-FORM INVARIANCE
Of equal if not greater importance than the issue of controllability is the as-
sumption of reduced-form invariance to the change in operating procedures
proposed by Feldstein and Stock. In this section we investigate the likely effects
on reduced-form parameters if the Fed were to change its operating procedures
from an interest rate feedback rule that responds to economic performance to a
rule that targets M2. We do this for both an interest rate instrument and a total
reserves instrument.
We use a simple log-linear rational expectations model for our investi-
gation. Since monetary economics lacks an acceptable model, we choose to
examine the issue of reduced-form invariance by examining a calibrated linear
rational expectations model. While this model falls short of representing reality,
it contains a number of key features found in many macroeconomic models
and is useful for broadly illustrating the points we wish to make. The model is
given by
ys
t = yt−1 + as(pt − Et−1pt) + ut (11)
yd
t = a0 + yt−1 − ad(pt + rt − Etpt+1) + wt (12)         
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md
t = pt − crrt + cyyt + vt (13)
rt = b0 + bp∆pt + by∆yt + brrt−1 + bmmt−1 + xt. (14)
All variables with the exception of the nominal interest rate are in logs. Equa-
tion (11) is the standard Lucas supply curve relating real output to unexpected
price-level movements, while (12) is an IS curve in which aggregate demand
responds negatively to increases in the real rate of interest. Equation (13) is
the demand function for M2 and (14) is the Fed’s interest rate rule.12 The Fed
is modeled as responding to inﬂation, ∆Pt, and real output growth, ∆yt, while
maintaining concern for some degree of interest rate smoothing. The Fed also
responds to past M2 behavior using M2 as an information variable as opposed
to using it as an intermediate target. (For a more complete discussion of models
of this kind, see McCallum [1980].)
We can illustrate the extent to which the reduced form of this hypothetical
economy is invariant to changes in operating procedures by examining how
endogenous variables ﬂuctuate around their expected value. A more complete
analysis would present the entire reduced form, but the anticipated parts of the
solution do not yield a simple analytical representation. We therefore present
only the unanticipated portion of the reduced-form solution. For the system
(11)–(14) these ﬂuctuations are
˜ yt = (1/D){ad(1 + bp)ut + aswt + xt} (15)
˜ pt = (1/D){−(1 + adby)ut + wt + xt} (16)
˜ rt = (1/D){(adby − bp)ut + (asby + bp)wt + axt} (17)
˜ mt = (1/D){[−(1 + adby) − cr(adby − bp) + cy(ad(1 + bp))]ut + vt
+ [1 − cr(asby + bp) + cyas]wt + [1 − cr(as + ad) + cy]xt}, (18)
where the “˜” notation indicates unexpected deviations (e.g., ˜ yt = yt − Et−1yt)
and D = as + ad + ad(bp + asby).
If the Fed were to alter its policy rule (14) and use a noisy interest rate
instrument, such as borrowed reserves, instead of directly controlling the funds
rate, then the basic change in the economic system would be captured by an
increased variance in xt (the unexplainable part of policy). The solutions for
the reduced-form parameters in terms of the structural parameters would be
largely unchanged.13
12 Fuhrer and Moore (1993) ﬁnd a similar rule helps ﬁt the data quite well when included
in their contracting model.
13 Dotsey (1989) shows that allowing banks to have private information does affect the
reduced-form coefﬁcients. For reasonable parameters, however, this effect is very small.            
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The changes in operating procedures over the period of the Feldstein and
Stock analysis—the announced move to nonborrowed reserve targeting under
lagged reserve requirements and the gradual emphasis placed on a borrowed
reserve target later on—amounted to a noisy interest rate instrument. Also,
as long as the Fed is using an interest rate instrument changes in reserve
requirements, or the move from lagged reserve to contemporaneous reserve
requirements, are largely inconsequential. Finally, the removal of Regulation
Q ceilings should have very little impact on the interest elasticity of money
demand if banks face fairly constant marginal costs of providing transactions
services and if they price deposits competitively.14 The stability that Feldstein
and Stock ﬁnd in their reduced-form estimates is, therefore, not surprising.
The change in operating procedures they contemplate, namely, directly
targeting M2, may be an entirely different matter. To investigate the effect
on the economies reduced form, we replace equation (14) by an equation that
describes the Fed as targeting M2 with an interest rate instrument. This equation
is given by
rt = (1/cr)[Et−1pt + cyEt−1yt − m∗
t ], (14 )
where m∗
t is the target level of M2. Equations (15)–(18) would become
˜ yt = (ad/a)ut + (as/a)wt (15 )
˜ pt = (−1/a)ut + (1/a)wt (16 )
˜ rt = 0 (17 )
˜ mt = [(ad − 1)/a]wt + [(1 + as)/a]wt + vt, (18 )
where a = as + ad. This reduced-form system is quite different from the
one shown previously, implying that the assumption of structural invariance is
somewhat tenuous.
Alternatively, the Fed could attempt to control M2 by placing a uniform
reserve requirement, η , on M2 balances and controlling M2 through the supply
of total reserves. Under this policy, required reserves, RR, would then be equal
to η(M2−C), where C is currency, and total reserve demand would equal RR
14 If one thinks of the demand for money as responding to opportunity costs, then prior to the
removal of Regulation Q money demand was inﬂuenced by the nominal rate, r. After removal of
rate Q it was inﬂuenced by r−rM, where rM is the own rate. If marginal costs are fairly constant
and the banking system is competitive, then rM = (1 − λ)r and the opportunity cost of holding
money will be λr. One sees that dlogM/dlogr is invariant to this regulatory change when money
demand is of the constant elasticity form. If the demand for money is semi-logarithmic, then its
interest elasticity would be scaled by λ. Since the elasticity is very small to begin with, stability
tests may not be very sensitive to the removal of Regulation Q.            
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plus excess reserve demand, ER. A log-linear representation of total reserve
demand would be
trd
t = logη + mt − ζt + εt, (13  )
where tr is the log of total reserves, mt is the log of M2 balances, ζt = (ct/M2t)
and εt = ERt/[η(M2t − Ct)].15 If the Fed supplied total reserves in an attempt
to hit an M2 target, it could do so by setting trs
t = logη + m∗
t . If total reserve
control was exact then mt = m∗
t +ζt −εt and M2 will vary with movements in
currency and excess reserves. If the Fed instead controlled the monetary base,
then movements between currency and deposits would generally change M2.
Only if η = 1 and excess reserves were unimportant would strict M2 control
be achievable. In this case M2 would equal the monetary base. Note, however,
that although M2 is controllable, there is no longer a banking system since
without fractional reserves banks have no assets with which to make loans.
One suspects that such a policy would lead to ﬁnancial changes that would
considerably affect the correlation of nominal output and M2.
Again if we replace (13) with equation (13  ) and (14) with
trs
t = tr∗
t + xt, (14  )
where tr∗
t = logη + m∗
t and xt represents reserve control errors, then the
reduced-form representation for unexpected changes in economic activity are
˜ yt = (1/DD){−(adcy + cr)ut + crwt − ad(vt − xt − ζt + εt)} (15  )
˜ pt = (1/DD){−(ad/a)(adcy − 1)ut − (ad/a)(1 + ascy)wt
− ad(vt − xt − ζt + εt)} (16  )
˜ rt = (1/DD){(adcy − 1)ut + (1 + ascy)wt + a(vt − xt − ζt + εt)} (17  )
˜ mt = xt + ζt − εt, (18  )
where DD = (as + ad)cr + ad(1 + ascy). Again, the reduced form is not
invariant to this proposed change in operating procedures.
To investigate the extent of the reduced-form invariance, we calibrate the
three distinct structural models and examine the implied variance-covariance
matrices. In doing so, we set as = 1.0 and ad = .7. The ﬁrst value is taken
from King and Plosser (1986) while the second comes from Fuhrer and Moore
(1993).16 We assume M2 has a unitary income elasticity, cy = 1, and cr = 2
15 tr = log(RR + ER) = log[RR(1 + ER
RR)] = logRR + log(1 + ER
RR) ≈ logη + log(M2−C)
+ εt = logη + log[M(1−C
M )] + εt ≈ logη + m − ζ + ε.
16 Fuhrer and Moore’s coefﬁcient is actually the impact effect of aggregate demand to a
change in lagged value of the long-term real interest rate.         
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implies an interest elasticity of approximately −.10. Again following Fuhrer
and Moore, the coefﬁcients bp and by are assumed to be .1 and we set br =
bm = .1 as well.
To produce numerical results, we also need to say something about the vari-
ances of the structural disturbances. We assume that the variance of the shocks
to aggregate supply, aggregate demand, money demand, and Fed behavior are
all of the same magnitude σ2. The variances for the currency/M2 ratio, ζ, and
the excess reserve/M2 ratio, ε, are assumed to be somewhat smaller. These are
(1/16)σ2 and (1/1000)σ2, respectively. For example, a value of σ2 = .0001
would imply that 95 percent of the shocks to quarterly output supply growth
or output demand growth are ±2 percent. The (1/16)σ2 value for the variance
of ±C/M2 then implies that ﬂuctuations in this ratio are generally no larger
than .005 and the (1/1000)σ2 value implies that ﬂuctuations in ER/M2 seldom
exceed .0006.






































respectively. The differences are noticeable, indicating that it is inappropriate
to use a reduced-form structure from one type of policy rule to make inferences
about the effects of an alternative policy rule. Of interest, however, is the fact
that using a total reserves instrument to target M2 produces the lowest variance
in prices and real output. Whether this result would carry over to more detailed
structural models is unknown. Also, other types of rules, for example, those
advocated by McCallum (1988, 1993a), may be better still. It is obvious that
before jumping on an M2 bandwagon a lot of work remains to be done.
4. CONCLUSION
In this article we have critically examined the debate over using M2 as an
intermediate target of monetary policy. We have done this by focusing on two
largely empirical studies. We found that Friedman and Kuttner’s central result
that money does not Granger-cause real or nominal output is due to a model
misspeciﬁcation. When the cointegrating relationship among money, income,
prices, and interest rates is accounted for, money does indeed Granger-cause    
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output. We also found that Feldstein and Stock’s main result, that a monetary
policy that uses M2 as an intermediate target can substantially reduce the vari-
ance of nominal GDP growth, depends critically on their assumption that M2 is
perfectly controllable. When this assumption is realistically relaxed, the ability
of their policy to reduce the variance of nominal income growth is seriously
diminished.
More generally, our results cast doubt on the idea that either empirical
exercise is useful in analyzing alternative monetary policies. Studies, such
as Friedman and Kuttner’s, that base their conclusions solely on the use of
Granger-causality and reduced-form models do not provide a ﬁrm basis for
making a decision about the usefulness of a monetary aggregate under some
alternative operating procedure. The absence of Granger-causality may provide
little guidance for evaluating the usefulness of M2 or any other aggregate
for monetary policy. All that the absence of Granger-causality tells us is that
under current operating procedures some variable does not help forecast future
economic activity.
Further, the presence of Granger-causality does not in and of itself imply
that targeting the aggregate in question would be good monetary policy. In order
to undertake that exercise, one needs a theory and the corresponding structural
model. Simply using a reduced-form model as Feldstein and Stock do is inap-
propriate when that reduced form will not remain invariant to the contemplated
changes in policy. There does not seem to us any shortcuts that will substitute
for the hard and necessary work of building and analyzing structural models.
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